Tuesday, 15 May 2012

Credit rating agency


A acclaim appraisement bureau (CRA) is a aggregation that assigns acclaim ratings for issuers of assertive types of debt obligations as able-bodied as the debt instruments themselves. In some cases, the servicers of the basal debt are aswell accustomed ratings.

In a lot of cases, the issuers of balance are companies, appropriate purpose entities, accompaniment and bounded governments, non-profit organizations, or civic governments arising debt-like balance (i.e., bonds) that can be traded on a accessory market. A acclaim appraisement for an issuer takes into application the issuer's acclaim adeptness (i.e., its adeptness to pay aback a loan), and affects the absorption amount activated to the accurate aegis getting issued.

The amount of such aegis ratings has been broadly questioned afterwards the 2007-09 banking crisis. In 2003, the U.S. Balance and Exchange Commission submitt

Uses of ratings


Credit ratings are used by investors, issuers, investment banks, broker-dealers, and governments. For investors, credit rating agencies increase the range of investment alternatives and provide independent, easy-to-use measurements of relative credit risk; this generally increases the efficiency of the market, lowering costs for both borrowers and lenders. This in turn increases the total supply of risk capital in the economy, leading to stronger growth. It also opens the capital markets to categories of borrower who might otherwise be shut out altogether: small governments, startup companies, hospitals, and universities.
editRatings use by bond issuers
Issuers rely on credit ratings as an independent verification of their own credit-worthiness and the resultant value of the instruments they issue. In most cases, a significant bond issuance must have at least one rating from a respected CRA for the issuance to be successful (without such a rating, the issuance may be undersubscribed or the price offered by investors too low for the issuer's purposes). Studies by the Bond Market Association note that many institutional investors now prefer that a debt issuance have at least three ratings.
Issuers also use credit ratings in certain structured finance transactions. For example, a company with a very high credit rating wishing to undertake a particularly risky research project could create a legally separate entity with certain assets that would own and conduct the research work. This "special purpose entity" would then assume all of the research risk and issue its own debt securities to finance the research. The SPE's credit rating likely would be very low, and the issuer would have to pay a high rate of return on the bonds issued.
However, this risk would not lower the parent company's overall credit rating because the SPE would be a legally separate entity. Conversely, a company with a low credit rating might be able to borrow on better terms if it were to form an SPE and transfer significant assets to that subsidiary and issue secured debt securities. That way, if the venture were to fail, the lenders would have recourse to the assets owned by the SPE. This would lower the interest rate the SPE would need to pay as part of the debt offering.
The same issuer also may have different credit ratings for different bonds. This difference results from the bond's structure, how it is secured, and the degree to which the bond is subordinated to other debt. Many larger CRAs offer "credit rating advisory services" that essentially advise an issuer on how to structure its bond offerings and SPEs so as to achieve a given credit rating for a certain debt tranche. This creates a potential conflict of interest, of course, as the CRA may feel obligated to provide the issuer with that given rating if the issuer followed its advice on structuring the offering. Some CRAs avoid this conflict by refusing to rate debt offerings for which its advisory services were sought.
editRatings use by government regulators
Further information: Nationally recognized statistical rating organization
Regulators use credit ratings as well, or permit ratings to be used for regulatory purposes. For example, under the Basel II agreement of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, banking regulators can allow banks to use credit ratings from certain approved CRAs (called "ECAIs", or "External Credit Assessment Institutions") when calculating their net capital reserve requirements. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) permits investment banks and broker-dealers to use credit ratings from "Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations" (NRSRO) for similar purposes. The idea is that banks and other financial institutions should not need keep in reserve the same amount of capital to protect the institution against (for example) a run on the bank, if the financial institution is heavily invested in highly liquid and very "safe" securities (such as U.S. government bonds or short-term commercial paper from very stable companies).
CRA ratings are also used for other regulatory purposes as well. The US SEC, for example, permits certain bond issuers to use a shortened prospectus form when issuing bonds if the issuer is older, has issued bonds before, and has a credit rating above a certain level. SEC regulations also require that money market funds (mutual funds that mimic the safety and liquidity of a bank savings deposit, but without Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance) comprise only securities with a very high NRSRO rating. Likewise, insurance regulators use credit ratings to ascertain the strength of the reserves held by insurance companies.
In 2008, the US SEC voted unanimously to propose amendments to its rules2 that would remove credit ratings as one of the conditions for companies seeking to use short-form registration when registering securities for public sale.
This marks the first in a series of upcoming SEC proposals in accordance with Dodd-Frank to remove references to credit ratings contained within existing Commission rules and replace them with alternative criteria.
Under both Basel II and SEC regulations, not just any CRA's ratings can be used for regulatory purposes. (If this were the case, it would present a moral hazard).citation needed Rather, there is a vetting process of varying sorts. The Basel II guidelines3 (paragraph 91, et al.), for example, describe certain criteria that bank regulators should look to when permitting the ratings from a particular CRA to be used. These include "objectivity," "independence," "transparency," and others. Banking regulators from a number of jurisdictions have since issued their own discussion papers on this subject, to further define how these terms will be used in practice. (See The Committee of European Banking Supervisors Discussion Paper,4 or the State Bank of Pakistan ECAI Criteria).5
In the United States, since 1975, NRSRO recognition has been granted through a "No Action Letter" sent by the SEC staff. Following this approach, if a CRA (or investment bank or broker-dealer) were interested in using the ratings from a particular CRA for regulatory purposes, the SEC staff would research the market to determine whether ratings from that particular CRA are widely used and considered "reliable and credible." If the SEC staff determines that this is the case, it sends a letter to the CRA indicating that if a regulated entity were to rely on the CRA's ratings, the SEC staff will not recommend enforcement action against that entity. These "No Action" letters are made public and can be relied upon by other regulated entities, not just the entity making the original request. The SEC has since sought to further define the criteria it uses when making this assessment, and in March 2005 published a proposed regulation to this effect.
On September 29, 2006, US President George W. Bush signed into law the Credit Rating Reform Act of 2006.6 This law requires the US Securities and Exchange Commission to clarify how NRSRO recognition is granted, eliminates the "No Action Letter" approach and makes NRSRO recognition a Commission (rather than SEC staff) decision, and requires NRSROs to register with, and be regulated by, the SEC. S & P protested the Act on the grounds that it is an unconstitutional violation of freedom of speech.6 In the Summer of 2007 the SEC issued regulations implementing the act, requiring rating agencies to have policies to prevent misuse of nonpublic information, disclosure of conflicts of interest and prohibitions against "unfair practices".7
Recognizing CRAs' role in capital formation, some governments have attempted to jump-start their domestic rating-agency businesses with various kinds of regulatory relief or encouragement. This may, however, be counterproductive, if it dulls the market mechanism by which agencies compete, subsidizing less-capable agencies and penalizing agencies that devote resources to higher-quality opinions.
editRatings use in structured finance
Credit rating agencies may also play a key role in structured financial transactions. Unlike a "typical" loan or bond issuance, where a borrower offers to pay a certain return on a loan, structured financial transactions may be viewed as either a series of loans with different characteristics, or else a number of small loans of a similar type packaged together into a series of "buckets" (with the "buckets" or different loans called "tranches"). Credit ratings often determine the interest rate or price ascribed to a particular tranche, based on the quality of loans or quality of assets contained within that grouping.
Companies involved in structured financing arrangements often consult with credit rating agencies to help them determine how to structure the individual tranches so that each receives a desired credit rating. For example, a firm may wish to borrow a large sum of money by issuing debt securities. However, the amount is so large that the return investors may demand on a single issuance would be prohibitive. Instead, it decides to issue three separate bonds, with three separate credit ratings—A (medium low risk), BBB (medium risk), and BB (speculative) (using Standard & Poor's rating system).
The firm expects that the effective interest rate it pays on the A-rated bonds will be much less than the rate it must pay on the BB-rated bonds, but that, overall, the amount it must pay for the total capital it raises will be less than it would pay if the entire amount were raised from a single bond offering. As this transaction is devised, the firm may consult with a credit rating agency to see how it must structure each tranche—in other words, what types of assets must be used to secure the debt in each tranche—in order for that tranche to receive the desired rating when it is issued.
There has been criticism in the wake of large losses in the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) market that occurred despite being assigned top ratings by the CRAs. For instance, losses on $340.7 million worth of CDOs issued by Credit Suisse Group added up to about $125 million, despite being rated AAA or Aaa by Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Service and Fitch Group.8
The rating agencies respond that their advice constitutes only a "point in time" analysis, that they make clear that they never promise or guarantee a certain rating to a tranche, and that they also make clear that any change in circumstance regarding the risk factors of a particular tranche will invalidate their analysis and result in a different credit rating. In addition, some CRAs do not rate bond issuances upon which they have offered such advice.
Complicating matters, particularly where structured finance transactions are concerned, the rating agencies state that their ratings are opinions (and as such, are protected free speech, granted to them by the "personhood" of corporations) regarding the likelihood that a given debt security will fail to be serviced over a given period of time, and not an opinion on the volatility of that security and certainly not the wisdom of investing in that security. In the past, most highly rated (AAA or Aaa) debt securities were characterized by low volatility and high liquidity—in other words, the price of a highly rated bond did not fluctuate greatly day-to-day, and sellers of such securities could easily find buyers.
However, structured transactions that involve the bundling of hundreds or thousands of similar (and similarly rated) securities tend to concentrate similar risk in such a way that even a slight change on a chance of default can have an enormous effect on the price of the bundled security. This means that even though a rating agency could be correct in its opinion that the chance of default of a structured product is very low, even a slight change in the market's perception of the risk of that product can have a disproportionate effect on the product's market price, with the result that an ostensibly AAA or Aaa-rated security can collapse in price even without there being any default (or significant chance of default). This possibility raises significant regulatory issues because the use of ratings in securities and banking regulation (as noted above) assumes that high ratings correspond with low volatility and high liquidity.

Criticism


Credit appraisement agencies do not abatement companies promptly enough. For example, Enron's appraisement remained at investment brand four canicule afore the aggregation went bankrupt, admitting the actuality that acclaim appraisement agencies had been acquainted of the company's problems for months.910 Or, for example, Moody's gave Freddie Mac adopted banal the top appraisement until Warren Buffett talked about Freddie on CNBC and on the next day Moody's downgraded Freddie to one beat aloft clutter bonds.11 Some empiric studies accept authentic that crop spreads of accumulated bonds alpha to aggrandize as acclaim superior deteriorates but afore a appraisement downgrade, implying that the bazaar about leads a abatement and analytic the advisory amount of acclaim ratings.12 This has led to suggestions that, rather than await on CRA ratings in cyberbanking regulation, cyberbanking regulators should instead crave banks, broker-dealers and allowance firms (among others) to use acclaim spreads if artful the accident in their portfolio.

Large accumulated appraisement agencies accept been criticized for accepting too accustomed a accord with aggregation management, possibly aperture themselves to disproportionate access or the vulnerability of getting misled.13 These agencies accommodated frequently in getting with the administration of abounding companies, and admonish on accomplishments the aggregation should crop to advance a assertive rating. Furthermore, because advice about ratings changes from the above CRAs can advance so bound (by chat of mouth, email, etc.), the above CRAs allegation debt issuers, rather than investors, for their ratings. This has led to accusations that these CRAs are bedeviled by conflicts of absorption that ability arrest them from accouterment authentic and honest ratings. At the aforementioned time, added generally, the better agencies (Moody's and Standard & Poor's) are about apparent as announcement a bigoted focus on acclaim ratings, possibly at the amount of employees, the environment, or abiding assay and development.citation needed These accusations are not absolutely consistent: on one hand, the above CRAs are accused of getting too comfortable with the companies they rate, and on the added duke they are accused of getting too focused on a company's "bottom line" and afraid to accept to a company's explanations for its actions.citation needed.

While about accused of getting too abutting to aggregation administration of their absolute clients, CRAs accept aswell been accused of agreeable in heavy-handed "blackmail" approach in adjustment to accost business from new clients, and blurred ratings for those firms . For instance, Moody's appear an "unsolicited" appraisement of Hannover Re, with a consecutive letter to the allowance close advertence that "it looked advanced to the day Hannover would be accommodating to pay". If Hannover administration refused, Moody's connected to accord Hannover Re ratings, which were downgraded over alternating years, all while authoritative transaction requests that the insurer rebuffed. In 2004, Moody's cut Hannover's debt to clutter status, and even admitting the insurer's added appraisement agencies gave it able marks, shareholders were abashed by the abatement and Hannover absent $175 actor USD in bazaar capitalization.14

The blurred of a acclaim account by a CRA can actualize a abandoned aeon and self-fulfilling prophecy, as not alone absorption ante for that aggregation would go up, but added affairs with cyberbanking institutions may be afflicted adversely, causing an access in costs and after abatement in acclaim worthiness. In some cases, ample loans to companies accommodate a article that makes the accommodation due in abounding if the companies' acclaim appraisement is bargain above a assertive point (usually a "speculative" or "junk bond" rating). The purpose of these "ratings triggers" is to ensure that the coffer is able to lay affirmation to a anemic company's assets afore the aggregation declares defalcation and a receiver is appointed to bisect up the claims adjoin the company. The aftereffect of such ratings triggers, however, can be devastating: beneath a worst-case scenario, already the company's debt is downgraded by a CRA, the company's loans become due in full; back the afflicted aggregation acceptable is butterfingers of paying all of these loans in abounding at once, it is affected into defalcation (a alleged "death spiral"). These appraisement triggers were active in the collapse of Enron. Back that time, above agencies accept put added accomplishment into audition these triggers and black their use, and the U.S. Balance and Exchange Commission requires that accessible companies in the United States acknowledge their existence.

Agencies are sometimes accused of getting oligopolists,15 because barriers to bazaar access are top and appraisement bureau business is itself reputation-based (and the accounts industry pays little absorption to a appraisement that is not broadly recognized). Of the ample agencies, alone Moody's is a separate, about captivated association that discloses its cyberbanking after-effects after concoction by non-ratings businesses, and its top accumulation margins (which at times accept been greater than 50 percent of gross margin) can be construed as constant with the blazon of allotment one ability apprehend in an industry which has top barriers to entry.16

Credit Appraisement Agencies accept fabricated errors of acumen in appraisement structured products, decidedly in allotment AAA ratings to structured debt, which in a ample amount of cases has after been downgraded or defaulted. The absolute adjustment by which Moody's ante CDOs has aswell appear beneath scrutiny. If absence models are biased to cover approximate absence abstracts and "Ratings Factors are biased low compared to the accurate akin of accepted defaults, the Moody’s method will not accomplish an adapted akin of boilerplate defaults in its absence administration process. As a result, the perceived absence anticipation of rated tranches from a top crop CDO will be afield biased downward, accouterment a apocryphal faculty of aplomb to appraisement agencies and investors."17 Little has been done by appraisement agencies to abode these shortcomings advertence a abridgement of allurement for superior ratings of acclaim in the avant-garde CRA industry. This has led to problems for several banks whose basic requirements depend on the appraisement of the structured assets they hold, as able-bodied as ample losses in the cyberbanking industry.181920 AAA rated mortgage balance trading at alone 80 cents on the dollar, implying a greater than 20% adventitious of default, and 8.9% of AAA rated structured CDOs are getting advised for abatement by Fitch, which expects a lot of to abatement to an boilerplate of BBB to BB-. These levels of assay are hasty for AAA rated bonds, which accept the aforementioned appraisement chic as US government bonds.2122 A lot of appraisement agencies do not draw a acumen amid AAA on structured accounts and AAA on accumulated or government bonds (though their ratings releases about alarm the blazon of aegis getting rated). Abounding banks, such as AIG, fabricated the aberration of not captivation abundant basic in assets in the accident of downgrades to their CDO portfolio. The anatomy of the Basel II agreements meant that CDOs basic affirmation rose 'exponentially'. This fabricated CDO portfolios accessible to assorted downgrades, about bottomward a ample allowance call. For archetype beneath Basel II, a AAA rated securitization requires basic allocation of alone 0.6%, a BBB requires 4.8%, a BB requires 34%, whilst a BB(-) securitization requires a 52% allocation. For a amount of affidavit (frequently accepting to do with bare agents ability and the costs that accident administration programs entail), abounding institutional investors relied alone on the ratings agencies rather than administering their own assay of the risks these instruments posed. (As an archetype of the complication circuitous in allegory some CDOs, the Aquarius CDO anatomy has 51 issues abaft the banknote CDO basic of the anatomy and addition 129 issues that serve as advertence entities for $1.4 billion in CDS affairs for a absolute of 180. In a sample of just 40 of these, they had on boilerplate 6500 loans at origination. Projecting that amount to all 180 issues implies that the Aquarius CDO has acknowledgment to about 1.2 actor loans.) Pimco architect William Gross apprenticed investors to avoid appraisement bureau judgments, anecdotic the agencies as "an idiot adept with a abounding command of the mathematics, but no abstraction of how to administer them."23

Many of the structured cyberbanking articles that they were amenable for rating, consisted of lower superior 'BBB' rated loans, but were, if affiliated calm into CDOs, assigned an AAA rating. The backbone of the CDO was not wholly abased on the backbone of the basal loans, but in actuality the anatomy assigned to the CDO in question. CDOs are usually paid out in a 'waterfall' appearance fashion, area assets accustomed gets paid out aboriginal to the accomplished tranches, with the actual assets abounding down to the lower superior tranches i.e.

It has aswell been appropriate that the acclaim agencies are conflicted in allotment absolute acclaim ratings back they accept a political allurement to appearance they do not charge stricter adjustment by getting anytime analytical in their appraisal of governments they regulate.25

As allotment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress ordered the U.S. SEC to advance a report, blue-blooded "Report on the Role and Function of Acclaim Appraisement Agencies in the Operation of the Balance Markets"26 account how acclaim ratings are acclimated in U.S. adjustment and the action issues this use raises. Partly as a aftereffect of this report, in June 2003, the SEC appear a "concept release" alleged "Rating Agencies and the Use of Acclaim Ratings beneath the Federal Balance Laws"27 that approved accessible animadversion on abounding of the issues aloft in its report. Accessible comments on this abstraction absolution accept aswell been appear on the SEC's website.

In December 2004, the International Organization of Balance Commissions (IOSCO) appear a Code of Conduct28 for CRAs that, a allotment of added things, is advised to abode the types of conflicts of absorption that CRAs face. All of the above CRAs accept agreed to assurance on to this Code of Conduct and it has been accepted by regulators alignment from the European Commission to the U.S. Balance and Exchange Commission.

Attempts to adapt added carefully acclaim appraisement agencies in the deathwatch of the European absolute debt crisis accept been rather unsuccessful. Some European cyberbanking adjustment experts accept argued that the agilely drafted, anyhow antipodal in civic law, and ailing activated EU aphorism on appraisement agencies (Règlement CE n° 1060/2009) has had little aftereffect on the way cyberbanking analysts and economists adapt abstracts or abeyant battle of interests created by the circuitous acknowledged arrange amid acclaim appraisement agencies and their clients" 29

editOligopoly produced by regulation

According to assistant Frank Partnoy, the adjustment of CRAs by the Balance and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the FED has alone antagonism amid CRAs and about affected bazaar participants to use the casework of the three big agencies, Standard and Poor's, Moody's and Fitch.30

SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey has said that these CRAs accept acted abundant like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and added companies that boss the bazaar because of government actions. If the CRAs gave ratings that were "catastrophically misleading, the ample appraisement agencies enjoyed their a lot of assisting years anytime during the accomplished decade."30

To break this problem, Ms. Casey proposed to abolish the NRSRO rules completely.30 Aswell assistant Lawrence White (NYU) has fabricated the aforementioned proposition.31 Assistant Frank Partnoy suggests that the regulators should assurance in acclaim accident bandy markets instead of NRSROs.30

The CRAs accept fabricated aggressive suggestions that would, instead, add added regulations that would accomplish bazaar access even added big-ticket than it is now.31

editRegulatory assurance on acclaim ratings

Think-tanks such as the World Pensions Council accept argued that European admiral such as France and Germany pushed dogmatically and aboveboard for the acceptance of the alleged “Basel II recommendations”, adopted in 2005, antipodal in European Union law through the Basic Requirements Directive (CRD), able back 2008. In essence, they affected European banks, and, added importantly, the European Central Coffer itself if appraisal the solvency of cyberbanking institutions, to await added than anytime on connected assessments of acclaim accident marketed by two clandestine US agencies- Moody’s and S&P, appropriately application accessible action and ultimately taxpayers’ money to strengthen an anti-competitive duopolistic industry.32

List of credit rating agencies


Agencies that accredit acclaim ratings for corporations include:

A. M. Best (U.S.)

Baycorp Advantage (Australia)

Bulgarian Acclaim Appraisement Bureau (Bulgaria, European Union)

Capital Intelligence (Cyprus)33

Capital Standards Appraisement (Kuwait)34

Credo band (Ukraine)

CreditSiren 35(European Union)

Credit Appraisement Information and Services Limited(CRISL),36(Bangladesh)

Dagong Global (People's Republic of China)

Dominion Bond Appraisement Service (Canada)

Egan-Jones Appraisement Company (U.S.)

First Afghan Acclaim Risk Ratings (Afghanistan)FACRR

Fitch Ratings (Dual-headquartered U.S./UK), 80% of which is endemic by FIMALAC, a French firm.

Global Acclaim Ratings Co. (Africa)

CRISIL (India)

CARE (India)

ICRA Limited (India)

Japan Acclaim Appraisement Agency, Ltd. (Japan)37

Kroll Bond Appraisement Bureau (U.S.)

Moody's Investors Service (U.S.)

Muros Ratings38 (Russia another appraisement agency)

Rapid Ratings International (U.S.)

Standard & Poor's (U.S.)

Weiss Ratings (U.S.)

The Big Three


The Big Three acclaim appraisement agencies are Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investor Service, and Fitch Ratings.39 Moody's and S&P anniversary ascendancy about 40 percent of the market. Third-ranked Fitch Ratings, which has about a 14 percent bazaar share, sometimes is acclimated as an another to one of the added majors.40

editCRA business models

Most acclaim appraisement agencies chase one of two business models. Originally, all CRAs relied on a "subscriber-based" business archetypal area the CRA would not deliver the ratings for chargeless but would instead alone accommodate the ratings to subscribers to the CRA's publications. Subscription fees would accommodate the aggregate of the CRA's income. Today, a lot of abate CRAs still await on this business model, which proponents accept allows the CRA to broadcast ratings that are beneath acceptable to be brave by assertive types of conflicts of interest. By contrast, a lot of ample and medium-sized CRAs (including Moody's, S&P, Fitch, Japan Acclaim Ratings, R&I, A.M. Best and others) today await on an "issuer-pays" business archetypal in which a lot of of the CRA's acquirement comes from fees paid by the issuers themselves. Under this business model, while subscribers to the CRA's casework are still provided with added abundant letters allegory an issuer, these casework are a accessory antecedent of assets and a lot of ratings are provided to the accessible for free. Proponents of this archetypal altercate that if the CRA relied alone on subscriptions for income, the all-inclusive majority of bonds would go unrated back subscriber absorption is low for all but the better issuances. These proponents aswell altercate that while they face a bright battle of absorption adverse the issuers they amount (as declared above), the subscriber-based archetypal aswell presents conflicts of interest, back a individual subscriber may accommodate a ample allocation of a CRA's acquirement and the CRA may feel answerable to broadcast ratings that abutment that subscriber's investment decisions.

Open Antecedent model

In October 2011, a new accord based business archetypal alleged Wikirating was developed by Austrian mathematician Dorian Credé. The online association acclaim appraisement belvedere aims to accommodate a cellophane antecedent of acclaim appraisement information, advised by a common commnunity.41